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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No.  05-1638
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
TYREE LAJUAN MONTGOMERY,
               Appellant
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00565)
District Judge: Honorable Mary Little Cooper
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 27, 2007
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 4, 2007)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
    While the judgment and commitment order in this case was entered on January 31,1
2005 and Montgomery’s notice of appeal was filed more than ten days later, on February
28, 2005, the District Court granted Montgomery’s motion for extension of time to file
his appeal.  The notice is therefore timely pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(b)(4). 
2
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Tyree Montgomery pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
He appeals his criminal sentence of 130 months as unreasonable.  See United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 326-28 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court had subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction to review the sentence
for reasonableness pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).   Cooper, 437 F.3d at 327.  For the1
following reasons, we will affirm the sentence embodied in the judgment and
commitment order.
In assessing the reasonableness of a sentence, we must determine whether the
District Court “exercised its discretion by considering the relevant factors,” which are set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329.  “The record must demonstrate
the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.”  Id.  The District
Court, however, is not required to “discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a)
factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” 
Id.
3In addition to making sure that the District Court considered the factors, “we must
also ascertain whether those factors were reasonably applied to the circumstances of the
case.”  Id. at 330.  We give deference to the District Court’s determination, “the trial court
being in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular
circumstances of the case.”  Id.
Montgomery argues that, in determining his sentence, the District Court failed to
give meaningful consideration to the first § 3553(a) factor:  “the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”  According to
Montgomery, the District Court failed to consider the circumstances of his childhood,
including his parents’ drug use. 
The record, however, demonstrates that the District Court did consider those
circumstances.  During the sentencing hearing, after Montgomery described his past, the
Court stated:  “I can see the circumstances very clearly the way that you describe.  Very
hard.”  Also, after Montgomery’s lawyer agreed that it was not necessary to repeat the §
3553(a) factors, the Court stated that “the nature and circumstances of this offense and the
history and characteristics of this defendant are set forth in full detail in the presentence
report ... .”  That report, referenced by the Court, included the information that
Montgomery contends was ignored.  Thus, the District Court did consider that
information.  Montgomery’s argument to the contrary is simply inconsistent with the
record.
4Montgomery also argues that the District Court failed to reasonably apply the §
3553(a) factors in deciding whether to mitigate Montgomery’s sentence in light of the
length of time between the instant offense and the two prior convictions that served as the
basis for his being classified as a career offender.  At his sentencing, Montgomery moved
both for a downward departure under the Guidelines and for mitigation of the sentence in
light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Here, Montgomery cites to the
Court’s discussion of the downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines as
evidence that the Court relied too heavily on the Guidelines in deciding not to mitigate his
sentence pursuant to the § 3553(a) factors. 
Again, however, the record shows that the District Court considered those factors,
including the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to afford
adequate deterrence, to protect the public, and to provide educational or vocational
training.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).  The Court also considered the Sentencing
Guidelines as required by § 3553(a)(4), while recognizing that the guidelines are
advisory.  The Court explained the sentence as follows:
I am doing this under the advisory status of the guidelines with
careful, careful reference to the structure and terms of the guidelines that
apply to Mr. Montgomery.
I am, in fact, not granting a downward departure or a downward
variance on the first ground that defendant claimed, namely overstatement
of criminal history, because I do not believe that this is an appropriate case
on its facts for a downward movement from the guideline range on that
ground.
. . . .
5I have carefully considered whether to impose a sentence which is
lower than that which I have described, but I think that the policy reflected
in the guideline section pertaining to the possibility of a departure for over
representation of criminal history is not met here... .
. . . .
. . . [A]s exhaustively detailed in the presentence investigation report,
as well as the government’s sentencing memorandum, the two predicate
convictions ... are not by any means the limit of Mr. Montgomery’s total
criminal past.  In fact, it can be summarized as an unbroken record of
offenses of increasing degrees of severity ... .
. . . .
Each of those convictions carry with it escalating penalties of
incarceration, but unfortunately they were not sufficient to deter him from
returning to this lifestyle of drugs and actual or threatened violence on each
occasion when he regained his freedom.
. . . .
The goals of sentencing are represented here in the need for this
sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense ... .  And most importantly,
to afford adequate deterrence of Mr. Montgomery and to incapacitate Mr.
Montgomery for a sufficient time to protect the public from further crimes .
. . .
I’d note that it appears that he has his GED high school diploma, but
has not taken the opportunity to develop any vocational skills.  That at least
he can accomplish while in federal custody.
As I say, this sentence is imposed under the advisory basis of the
guidelines with due reference to the structure and terms of the guidelines as
they have been found to address the facts of this case.
That record shows that the District Court relied on the applicable § 3553(a) factors and
was not treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory.  Considering the deference
given to the District Court’s determination of an appropriate sentence under the
circumstances, we conclude that the sentence is reasonable in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and commitment order
entered by the District Court.
